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Abstract
We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give con-
ditions under wich the setwise-stable set, a core-like concept, is nonempty and can be
approached through an algorithm. The setwise-stable set coincides with the pairwise-
stable set, and with the predictions of a non-cooperative bargaining model. The set-wise
stable set possesses the canonical conflict/coincidence of interest properties from many-
to-one, and one-to-one models. The theory parallels the standard theory of stability
for many-to-one, and one-to-one, models. We provide results for a number of core-like
solutions, besides the setwise-stable set.
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1 Introduction
Consider a collection of firms and consultants. Each firm wishes to hire a set of con-
sultants, and each consultant wishes to work for a set of firms. Firms have preferences
over the possible sets of consultants, and consultants have preferences over the possible
sets of firms. This is an example of a “many-to-many” matching market. A matching
is an assignment of sets of consultants to firms, and of sets of firms to consultants, so
that firm f is assigned to consultant w if and only if w is also assigned to f . The prob-
lem is to predict which matchings can occur as a result of bargaining between firms and
consultants.
Many-to-many matching markets are worse understood than many-to-one markets—
markets where firms hire many workers, but each worker works for only one firm. The
many-to-one market model seems to describe most labor markets, so why should one
study many-to-many markets? There are two reasons.
First, some important real-world markets are many-to-many. One example is firms/consultants.
But the best-know example is probably the market for medical interns in the U.K.
(Roth and Sotomayor, 1990). The medical-interns example is important because it works
through centralized matching mechanisms. And many-to-one theory has helped under-
stand and shape centralized matching mechanisms for medical interns in the U.S. (Roth
and Peranson, 1999). Another example is the assignment of teachers to highschools in
some countries (35% of teachers in Argentina work in more than one school). The assign-
ment of teachers to highschools is a clear candidate for a centralized solution guided by
theory. Finally, one can view many-to-many matching as an abstract model of long-term
contracting between firms and providers.
Second, even a few many-to-many contracts can make a crucial difference, and most
labor markets have at least a few many-to-many contracts. We present an example
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(Section 2.2) where the number of agents can be arbitrarily large, but still one many-to-
many contract changes the contracting outcome for all agents. In the U.S., 76% of total
employment is in industries with 5% or more multiple jobholders (Source: U.S. Bureau
of Labor Statistics). If even a few multiple jobholders (many-to-many contracts) make
an important difference, we need a many-to-many model to understand the bulk of the
labor markets in the U.S.
Finally, characterizing the core in many-to-many matchings is listed in Open Problem
6 in Roth and Sotomayor (1990, page 246)—the classic on matching markets. We give
an answer to this problem.
We shall first give an overview of our results. Then we place our results in the related
literature.
1.1 Overview of results
We argue that the core is not the right solution for many-to-many markets. One problem
is that the core may not be “individually rational,” in the sense that there are core
matchings where a firm—for example—would be better off firing some worker. Another
problem is that the core may not be “pairwise stable,” in the sense that there may be a
firm f and a worker w that are not currently matched, but where w would like to work
for f , and f would like to hire w. In one-to-one, and many-to-one, matching markets,
the standard solution is the set of pairwise-stable, and individually-rational, matchings.
In those markets, the solution coincides with the core.
We consider alternatives to the core. One alternative is the setwise-stable set of Roth
(1984) and Sotomayor (1999): the set of individually-rational matchings that cannot be
blocked by a coalition who forms new links only among themselves—but may preserve
their links to agents that are not in the coalition. A second alternative is the individually-
rational core (defined implicitly by Sotomayor (1999)): the set of individually-rational
matchings that cannot be blocked using an individually-rational matching. A third alter-
native is the pairwise-stable set, described in the previous paragraph. A fourth alternative
is a set we denote by E : matchings where each agent a is choosing her best set of partners,
out of the set of potential partners who, given their current match, are willing to link
to a. The definition of E is circular.
Matching theory proceeds normally by adding hypotheses on agents’ preferences. We
shall work with two hypotheses. The first is “substitutability”—first introduced by Kelso
and Crawford (1982), and used extensively in the matching literature. The second is a
strengthening of substitutability that we call “strong substitutability.”
Let f be a firm. Substitutability of f ’s preferences requires: “if hiring w is optimal
when certain workers are available, hiring w must still be optimal when a subset of
workers are available.” Strong substitutability requires: “if hiring w is optimal when
certain workers are available, hiring w must still be optimal when a worse set of workers
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are available.” Using a sports analogy, substitutability means that if w has a contract
with the L.A. Lakers, and is chosen to play for the West’s All Star Team, then w should
play in the Lakers’ first team. Strong substitutability means that, if w is good enough
to play for the Lakers, w must be good enough to play for the L.A. Clippers.
Strong substitutability is stronger than substitutability. But it is weaker than sepa-
rability, and not stronger than responsiveness—two other assumptions used in matching
theory (separability is also used extensively in social choice).
We now enumerate and briefly discuss our main results. For economy of exposition,
we present results as results on E . The implications for the other solutions should be
clear at all times.
If preferences are substitutable, E is nonempty, and we give an algorithm for finding
a matching in E ; E equals the set of pairwise-stable matchings; a basic non-cooperative
bargaining game—firms propose to workers, then workers propose to firms—has E as
its set of subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes; a matching in E which is blocked (in
the sense of the core) must be blocked in a “non-individually-rational way;” through a
coalition of agents that all have incentives to deviate from the block.
If firms’ preferences are substitutable, and workers’ preferences are strongly substi-
tutable, E equals the set of setwise-stable matchings, and a matching in E must be in the
individually-rational core. Thus setwise-stable matchings exist, the individually-rational
core is non-empty, and our algorithm finds a matching in the individually-rational core
that is setwise stable.
If preferences are substitutable, E has certain properties one can interpret as worker-
firm conflict of interest, and worker-worker (or firm-firm) coincidence of interest: E is a
lattice. That E is a lattice implies that there is a “firm-optimal” matching in E—a match-
ing that is simultaneously better for all firms, and worse for all workers, than any other
matching in E—and a “worker-optimal” matching in E—one that is best for all workers,
and worse for all firms. Besides the lattice-structure, there are other conflict/coincidence
of interest properties from one-to-one and many-to-one markets (Roth, 1985). We extend
these properties to many-to-many markets. If preferences are strongly substitutable, the
lattice operations on E are the canonical lattice operations from one-to-one matching
markets.
If firms’ preferences are substitutable, and workers’ preferences are strongly sub-
stitutable, the theory of many-to-many matchings parallels the theory of many-to-one
matchings: the setwise-stable set equals the pairwise-stable set, and the setwise-stable
set is a non-empty lattice. In the standard many-to-one model, firms’ preferences are
substitutable, and workers’ preferences are trivially strongly substitutable. So our model
encompasses and explains standard many-to-one theory.
In sum, we give conditions (substitutability, strong substitutability) under which our
alternatives to the core are non-empty and can be approached through an algorithm.
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The setwise-stable set, E , and the pairwise-stable set are identical, and possess a lat-
tice structure. The setwise-stable set, E , and the pairwise-stable set coincide with the
outcomes of a simple non-cooperative bargaining model. We reproduce and extend con-
flict/coincidence of interest properties.
1.2 Related Literature
Setwise stability was first defined by Roth (1984). Sotomayor (1999) emphasizes the
difference between setwise stability, pairwise stability, and the core. Sotomayor (1999)
presents examples where the setwise-stable set is empty; preferences in her examples are
not strongly substitutable (see our Example 22). Sotomayor (1999) refers to a definition
of core that in fact coincides with our individually-rational core. We are the first to prove
that the setwise-stable set and the individually-rational core are non-empty.
Recently, in independent work, Konishi and U¨nver (2003) proved that a concept they
call strong group-wise stability is equivalent to pairwise stability. Strong group-wise
stability is a concept from the theory of network formation, and it seems to be similar
to setwise stability. Konishi and U¨nver require preferences to be responsive and satisfy a
separability assumption; their structure is neither stronger or weaker than our. Konishi
and U¨nver also make the point that the core is not a good prediction in many-to-many
markets.
Roth (1984) proved that, with substitutable preferences, the pairwise-stable set is
nonempty, and that there are firm- and worker-optimal pairwise-stable matchings. Blair
(1988) proved that the pairwise-stable set has a lattice structure. We reproduce Roth’s
and Blair’s results using fixed-point methods—similar methods have been used in match-
ing contexts by Adachi (2000), Echenique and Oviedo (2003), Milgrom (2003), Roth and
Sotomayor (1988), and Fleiner (2001). But none of these papers address many-to-many
matchings. Roth (1985) discusses conflict/coincidence of interest beyond the lattice prop-
erty of pairwise-stable matchings. We extend Roth’s results to many-to-many matchings.
Alcalde, Pe´rez-Castrillo, and Romero-Medina (1998) and Alcalde and Romero-Medina
(2000) prove that the core is implemented in certain many-to-one models by simple
mechanisms, similar to the one we present in Section 7.
A precedent to our results on a bargaining set (defined in Section 4.3) is Klijn and
Masso´ (2003). Klijn and Masso´ study Zhou’s bargaining set for the one-to-one matching
model. The bargaining set we propose is different from Zhou’s bargaining set.
Finally, Mart´ınez, Masso´, Neme, and Oviedo (2003) present an algorithm that finds
all the pairwise-stable matchings in a many-to-many matching market.
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2 Motivating examples
We give two motivating examples. The first example shows that the core may be a
problematic solution. The second example shows that many-to-many matchings can be
important, even when they are rare.
2.1 The problem with the core
Example 1. Suppose the set of workers is W = {w1, w2, w3}, and the set of firms is
F = {f1, f2, f3}. Workers’ preferences are
P (w1) : f3, f2f3, f1f3, f1, f2
P (w2) : f1, f1f3, f1f2, f2, f3
P (w3) : f2, f1f2, f2f3, f3, f1.
The notation means that w1 prefers {f3} to {f3, f2}, {f3, f2} to {f3, f1}, {f3, f1} to {f1},
and so on. If A ⊆ F is not listed it means that ∅ is preferred to A. Firms’ preferences
are
P (f1) : w3, w2w3, w1w3, w1, w2
P (f2) : w1, w1w3, w1w2, w2, w3
P (f3) : w2, w1w2, w2w3, w3, w1.
Consider the matching µˆ defined by µˆ(w1) = {f2, f3}, µˆ(w2) = {f1, f3}, and µˆ(w3) =
{f1, f2}.
Note that µˆ is a core matching: To make f1—for example—better off than in µˆ, f1
should hire only w3, which would make w2 hired only by f3, so w2 would be worse off.
Now, if f1 is in a blocking coalition C, w3 must be in C. Then f2 must be in C, or w3
would only be hired by f1 and thus worse off. But f2 in C implies that w1 must be in C.
Then f3 must be in C, so w2 must also be in C—a contradiction, as w2 is worse off.
But is µˆ a reasonable prediction? Under µˆ, f1 is matched to w2 and w3, but would
in fact prefer to fire w2. The problem is that f1 is not “allowed” to fire w2 because—as
argued above—f1 would have to form a block that includes w2, and w2 is worse off if she
is fired.
Example 1 shows that core matchings need not be “individually rational.” Because
there are actions, like firing a worker, that an agent should be able to implement on its
own, but that the definition of core ends up tying into a larger coalition.
An additional problem, pointed out by Blair (1988) and Roth and Sotomayor (1990,
page 177) is that core matchings may not be pairwise stable (see also Sotomayor (1999)).
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2.2 Many-to-many vs. many-to-one
There is a large literature on one-to-one and many-to-one matchings. Many-to-many
matchings are a more general model. We have argued that, in many cases, the generality
matters. Here we present an an example supporting our argument; we observe that
the presence of a few many-to-many contracts can change the matching outcome for all
agents.
In Example 2, if one worker is allowed to match with more than one firm, the resulting
stable/core matching changes for a large number of agents. Thus, even in markets where
one-to-one, or many-to-one, is the rule, a few many-to-many contracts can make a big
difference.
Example 2. Let W = {w,w1, . . . w2K} and F =
{
f1, . . . fK , f
}
. The preferences of
workers wk, for k = 1, . . . 2K, are the same:
P (wk) : f1, f2, . . . fK , f .
The preferences of w are
P (w) : f1f, f , f1.
The preferences of firms fk for k = 2, . . . K are
P (fk) : w2k−2w2k−1, w2k−1w2k, ww2k.
Firms f1 and fK have preferences
P (f1) : ww1, w1w2
P (f) : w,w1, w2, . . . , wK .
Consider matchings µ and µ′ defined by
f1 f2 . . . fk . . . fK f
µ = w1w2 w3w4 . . . w2k−1w2k . . . w2K−1w2K w
µ′ = ww1 w2w3 . . . w2k−2w2k−1 . . . w2K−2w2K−1 w
First, if w is not allowed to match with more than one firm, then µ is the unique
core (and stable) matching. If w is allowed to match with more than one firm, then
〈{w} ,
{
f1, f
}
, µ′〉 blocks µ. Further, µ′ is the unique core matching.
The story behind the example should be familiar to academics. Suppose that firms
are universities. All workers wk agree about the ranking of firms: f1 is the best, followed
by f2, etc. Firm f is the worst. However, worker w, an established and coveted researcher
in her field, has a strong desire to work at f for geographic reasons (f is in the town
where w grew up, and that is where her family lives). If part-time (many-to-many)
appointments are not allowed, w will only work for f and the resulting matching is, in
all likelihood, µ. On the other hand, if w is allowed to have part-time appointments at
f and f1, µ
′ will result.
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3 Preliminary definitions
3.1 Lattices and preference relations
A (strict) preference relation P on a set X is a complete, anti-symmetric, and transitive
binary relation on X. We denote by R the weak preference relation associated to P ; so
xRy if and only if x = y or xPy. If A is a set, we refer to a list of preference relations
(P (a))a∈A as a preference profile.
Let X be a set, and B a partial order on X—a transitive, reflexive, and antisymmetric
binary relation. Let A ⊆ X. Denote by infB A the greatest lower bound, and by supB A
the lowest upper bound, on A in the order B. Say that the pair 〈X,B〉 is a lattice if,
whenever x, y ∈ X, both x ∧B y = infB{x, y} and x ∨B y = supB{x, y} exist in X. A
subset A ⊆ X is a sublattice of 〈X,B〉 if, whenever x, y ∈ A, both x ∧B y ∈ A and
x ∨B y ∈ A. A lattice 〈X,B〉 is a chain if, for any x, y ∈ X, xBy or yBx, or both, are
true.
A lattice 〈X,B〉 is distributive if, for all x, y, z ∈ X, x∨B (y∧Bz) = (x∨By)∧B (x∨Bz).
Let 〈X,B〉 and 〈Y,R〉 be lattices. A map ψ : X → Y is a lattice homomorphism if, for
all x, y ∈ X, ψ(x ∧B y) = ψ(x) ∧R ψ(y) and ψ(x ∨B y) = ψ(x) ∨R ψ(y). ψ is lattice
isomorphism if it is a bijection and a lattice homomorphism.
Remark 1. The product of lattices, when endowed with the product order, is a lattice
(Topkis, 1998, page 13). The lattice operations are the product of the component lattice
operations.
3.2 The Model
The model has three primitive components:
• a finite set W of workers,
• a finite set F , disjoint from W , of firms,
• a preference profile P = (P (a))a∈W∪F , where P (a) is a preference relation over 2
F
if a ∈W , and over 2W if a ∈ F .
If a ∈W ∪F is an agent, we shall refer to any subset A ⊆ W ∪F as a set of partners
of a. If a ∈ F , a’s partners will be subsets of W , and if a ∈ W , a’s partners will be
subsets of F .
Denote the preference profile (P (w))w∈W by P (W ), and (P (f))f∈F by P (F ).
The assignment problem consists of matching workers with firms, allowing that some
firms or workers remain unmatched. Formally,
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A matching µ is a mapping from the set F ∪W into the set of all subsets of F ∪W
such that for all w ∈W and f ∈ F :
1. µ (w) ∈ 2F .
2. µ (f) ∈ 2W .
3. f ∈ µ (w) if and only if w ∈ µ (f).
We denote by M the set of all matchings.
Given a preference relation P (a), the sets of partners preferred by a to the empty set
are called acceptable; so we allow that a firm prefers not hiring any worker rather than
hiring unacceptable sets of workers, and that a worker prefers to remain unemployed over
working for an unacceptable set of firms.
Given a set of partners S, let Ch (S, P (a)) denote agent a’s most-preferred subset of
S, according to a’s preference relation P (a). So Ch (S, P (a)) is the unique subset S ′ of
S such that S ′P (a)S ′′ for all S ′′ ⊆ S, S ′′ 6= S ′.
To express preference relations in a concise manner, and since only acceptable sets of
partners will matter, we will represent preference relations as lists of acceptable partners.
For instance,
P (fi) = w1w3, w2, w1, w3
P (wj) = f1f3, f1, f3
indicates that
{w1, w3}P (fi) {w2}P (fi) {w1}P (fi) {w3}P (fi) ∅
and
{f1, f3}P (wj) {f1}P (wj) {f3}P (wj) ∅.
We often omit brackets ({. . .}) when denoting sets.
3.3 Individual rationality, stability, and Core
Let P be a preference relation A matching µ is individually rational if µ(a)R(a)A, for all
A ⊆ µ(a), for all a ∈ W ∪ F . Hence a matching is individually rational if and only if
µ(a) = Ch(µ(a), P (a)),
for all a ∈ W ∪ F .
Individual rationality builds on the idea that links are voluntary: if agent a prefers a
proper subset A ( µ(a) of partners over µ(a), then she will upset µ by severing her links
to the agents in µ(a)\A.
Let w ∈ W , f ∈ F , and let µ be a matching. The pair (w, f) is a pairwise block of µ
if w /∈ µ (f), w ∈ Ch (µ (f) ∪ {w} , P (f)), and f ∈ Ch (µ (w) ∪ {f} , P (w)).
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Definition 3. A matching µ is pairwise stable if it is individually rational, and there is
no pairwise block of µ. Denote the set of stable matchings by S(P ).
Definition 4. A block of a matching µ is a triple 〈W ′, F ′, µ′〉, where F ′ ⊆ F , W ′ ⊆ W ,
and µ′ ∈M are such that
1. F ′ ∪W ′ 6= ∅,
2. µ′(W ′ ∪ F ′) ⊆ W ′ ∪ F ′,
3. µ′(s)R(s)µ(s), for all s ∈ F ′ ∪W ′,
4. and µ′(s)P (s)µ(s) for at least one s ∈ W ′ ∪ F ′.
In words, a block of a matching µ is a “recontracting” between a subset of workers
and firms, so that the agents who recontract are all weakly better off, and at least one
of them is strictly better off. Say that 〈W ′, F ′, µ′〉 blocks µ if 〈W ′, F ′, µ′〉 is a block of µ.
Definition 5. A matching µ is a core matching if there are no blocks of µ. Denote the
set of core matchings by C(P ).
3.4 Substitutability
Definition 6. An agent a’s preference relation P (a) satisfies substitutability if, for any
sets S and S ′ with S ⊆ S ′,
b ∈ Ch (S ′ ∪ b, P (a)) implies b ∈ Ch (S ∪ b, P (a)) .
A preference profile P = (P (a))a∈A is substitutable if, for each agent a ∈ A, P (a)
satisfies substitutability. Say that P (W ) (P (F )) is substitutable if for each a ∈ W
(a ∈ F ), P (a) satisfies substitutability.
4 Non-core setwise stability
4.1 The setwise-stable set
Definition 7. A set-wise block to a matching µ is a triple 〈W ′, F ′, µ′〉, where F ′ ⊆ F ,
W ′ ⊆ W , and µ′ ∈M are such that
1. F ′ ∪W ′ 6= ∅,
2. µ′(s)\µ(s) ⊆ F ′ ∪W ′, for all s ∈ F ′ ∪W ′,
3. µ′(s)P (s)µ(s), for all s ∈ F ′ ∪W ′,
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4. µ′(s) = Ch(µ′(s), P (s)), for all s ∈ F ′ ∪W ′
Definition 8. A matching µ is in the set-wise stable set if µ is individually rational, and
there are no set-wise blocks to µ. Denote the set of set-wise stable matchings by SW (P ).
The definition of SW (P ) is from Sotomayor (1999, Definition 2, pages 59–60).
Recall Example 1. We argued that the core matching µˆ (in fact the unique core
matching) is not a good prediction. Consider, instead, the matching defined by µ(wi) =
{fi}, for i = 1, 2, 3. It is easy, if somewhat cumbersome, to check that µ is set-wise stable.
It also has some interest to see why µ in Example 1 is not a core matching; 〈W,F, µˆ〉
blocks µ, as µˆ(w1) = {f2, f3}P (w1)µ(w1), µˆ(w2) = {f1, f3}P (w2)µ(w2), µˆ(w3) = {f1, f2}P (w3)µ(w3).
Similarly for firms. But this is a block from which all agents wish to unilaterally deviate.
We characterize the blocks of setwise-stable matchings in Section 8.
4.2 The individually-rational core
Definition 9. A block 〈W ′, F ′, µ′〉 is an individually-rational block if µ′(s) = Ch(µ′(s), P (s)),
for all s ∈ W ′ ∪ F ′.
Definition 10. A matching µ is in the individually-rational core if it is individually
rational, and it has no individually-rational blocks. Denote the set of individually-rational
core matchings by IRC(P ).
Sotomayor (1999) restricts attention to individually-rational matchings. So she im-
plicitly refers to the individually-rational core.
4.3 A bargaining set.
Let µ be a matching.
Definition 11. An objection to µ is a triple 〈W ′, F ′, µ′〉, where F ′ ⊆ F , W ′ ⊆ W , and
µ′ ∈M are such that
1. F ′ ∪W ′ 6= ∅,
2. µ′(s)\µ(s) ⊆ F ′ ∪W ′, for all s ∈ F ′ ∪W ′,
3. µ′(s)P (s)µ(s), for all s ∈ F ′ ∪W ′.
Let 〈W ′, F ′, µ′〉 be an objection to µ. A counter-objection to µ is an objection 〈W ′′, F ′′, µ′′〉
to µ′ such that F ′′ ⊆ F ′ and W ′′ ⊆ W ′.
Note that objections only require a partner’s “consent” if they involve new links.
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Definition 12. A matching µ is in the bargaining set if µ is individually rational, and
there are no objections without counterobjections to µ. Denote the bargaining set by
B(P ).
For the one-to-one model, Klijn and Masso´ (2003) prove that Zhou’s bargaining set
(Zhou, 1994) coincides with a weak pairwise-stability solution. The bargaining set we
propose is different from Zhou’s because counterobjections are only allowed from “within”
the objecting coalition.
4.4 The Blair Core
The definition of a block (Definition 4) makes formally sense for any profile of binary
relations (B(s))s∈W∪F . Accordingly, one can define the core matchings C(B) for any
profile B = (B(s))s∈W∪F of binary relations.
In particular, given a preference profile P = (P (s)), we can construct a binary relation
RB = (RB(s)) by saying that ARB(s)B if and only if A = B or A = Ch(A ∪ B,P (s)).
The strict relation PB is ARB(s)B if and only if A 6= B and A = Ch(A ∪ B,P (s)). We
call the resulting core, C(PB), the Blair-Core, as Blair (1988) introduced the relation
PB.
Note that a matching µ is in the Blair-Core if it is immune to deviations µ′ such that
µ′(a) = Ch(µ′(a)∪µ(a), P (a)). But µ′(a) = Ch(µ′(a)∪µ(a), P (a)) is only sufficient, and
not necessary, for µ′(a)P (a)µ(a). So the Blair-Core contains more matchings than the
core.
4.5 More pairwise stability
A pair (B, f) ∈ 2W ×F , with B 6= ∅, blocks* µ if B∩µ(f) = ∅, B ⊆ Ch(µ(f)∪B,P (f)),
and f ∈ Ch(µ(w) ∪ f, P (w)), for all w ∈ B. Similarly, A pair (w,A) ∈ W × 2F , with
A 6= ∅, blocks* µ if A∩µ(w) = ∅, A ⊆ Ch(µ(w)∪A,P (w)), and w ∈ Ch(µ(f)∪w,P (f)),
for all f ∈ A.
Definition 13. A matching µ is stable* if it is individually rational and there is no pair
(B, f) ∈ 2W × F that blocks* µ. A matching µ is stable** if it is stable*, and there is
no pair (w,A) ∈ W × 2F that blocks* µ. Denote the set of stable* matchings by S∗(P ),
and the set of stable** matchings by S∗∗(P ).
5 A fixed-point approach.
We construct a map T on the set of “pre-matchings,” a superset of M. We shall use the
fixed points of T to prove results on the different notions of stability.
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5.1 Pre-matchings
Say that a pair ν = (νF , νW ), with νF : F → 2
W and νW : W → 2
F , is a pre-matching.
Let VW (VF ) denote the set of all νW (νF ) functions. Thus, VF =
(
2W
)F
, VW =
(
2F
)W
.
Denote the set of pre–matchings ν = (νF , νW ) by V = VF × VW . We shall often refer to
νW (w) by ν(w) and to νF (f) by ν(f).
A pre-matching ν is a matching if ν is such that νW (w) = f if and only if w ∈ νF (f) .
5.2 The map T
Let ν be a pre-matching, and let
U (f, ν) = {w ∈W : f ∈ Ch (ν (w) ∪ {f}, P (w))} ,
and
V (w, ν) = {f ∈ F : w ∈ Ch (ν (f) ∪ {w}, P (f))} .
The set V (w, µ) is the set of firms f that are willing to hire w, possibly after firing some
of the workers it was assigned by ν. The set U(f, ν) is the set of workers w that are
willing to add f to its set of firms ν(w), possibly after firing some firms in ν(w).
Now, define T : V → V by
(Tν) (s) =
{
Ch (U (s, ν) , P (s)) if s ∈ F
Ch (V (s, ν) , P (s)) if s ∈W.
The map T has a simple interpretation: (Tν)(f) is firm f ’s optimal team of workers,
among those willing to work for f , and (Tν)(w) is the set of firms preferred by w, among
the firms that are willing to hire w.
We shall denote by E the set of fixed points of T , so
E = {ν ∈ V : ν = Tν} .
Recall Example 1 and matching µ from Section 4.1. Note that µ, the unique setwise-
stable matching, is a fixed-point of T : V (w1, µ) = {f1, f2}, so {f1} = Ch(V (w1, µ), P (w1)),
V (w2, µ) = {f2, f3}, so {f2} = Ch(V (w2, µ), P (w2)), and V (w3, µ) = {f1, f3}, so {f3} =
Ch(V (w3, µ), P (w2)). Similarly for firms.
Further, µˆ, the unique core matching in Example 1, is not a fixed-point of T ; as
U(f1, µˆ) = {w2} and {w2, w3} 6= Ch(U(f1, µˆ), P (f1)).
Definition 14. The T -algorithm is the procedure of iterating T , starting at some pre-
matching ν.
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Note that the T -algorithm stops at ν ′ ∈ V if and only if ν ′ ∈ E .
Let ν0 and ν1 be the prematchings defined by ν0(f) = ν1(w) = ∅, ν0(w) = F , and
ν1(f) = W for all w and f . We shall consider the T -algorithm starting at prematchings
ν0 and ν1. See Echenique and Oviedo (2003) for a discussion of the T -algorithm in the
many-to-one model.
6 Non-emptiness of, and relations between, solutions.
We organize the results according to the structure needed on preferences. In some results,
we impose structure on one side of the market only; we impose weakly more structure
on workers’ preferences. The model is symmetric, so it should be clear that appropri-
ate versions of the results are true, interchanging the structure on workers’ and firms’
preferences.
6.1 Results under substitutability
Theorem 15. E ⊆ S∗∗(P ) ⊆ S∗(P ) ⊆ S(P ). Further:
1. If P (W ) is substitutable, then
S∗∗(P ) = S∗(P ) = E ⊆ C(PB).
2. If P is substitutable, then S(P ) = E, E is nonempty, and the T -algorithm finds a
matching in E.
6.2 Results under strong substitutability
Definition 16. An agent a’s preference ordering P (a) satisfies strong substitutability if,
for any sets S and S ′, with S ′P (a)S,
b ∈ Ch(S ′ ∪ b, P (a)) implies b ∈ Ch(S ∪ b, P (a)).
Say that a preference profile P is strongly substitutable if P (a) satisfies strong substi-
tutability for every agent a.
Proposition 17. If P (a) satisfies strong substitutability, then it satisfies substitutability.
Proof. Let S and S ′ be sets of agents, with S ⊆ S ′. Suppose that b ∈ C ′ = Ch(S ′ ∪
b, P (a)). We shall prove that b ∈ Ch(S ∪ b, P (a)).
Note that C ′ = Ch(C ′, P (a)). Now, S ∪ b ⊆ S ′ ∪ b implies that C ′R(a)S ∪ b. If
C ′ = S ∪ b then S ∪ b = Ch(S ∪ b, P (a)) and we are done. Let C ′P (a)S ∪ b. Then
b ∈ Ch(S ∪ b, P (a)), as P (a) satisfies strong substitutability.
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Theorem 18. SW (P ) ⊆ E and B(P ) ⊆ E. Further, if P (F ) is substitutable, and P (W )
is strongly substitutable, then E = SW (P ) = B(P ), and E ⊆ IRC(P ).
Thus, when one side of the market has strongly substitutable preferences, we can
characterize the setwise-stable set. In light of Proposition 17, Theorem 18 implies that
S(P ) = SW (P ).
Theorem 19. If P (F ) is substitutable, and P (W ) is strongly substitutable, then S(P ),
IRC(P ), SW (P ), and B(P ) are non-empty. The T -algorithm finds a matching in S(P ),
IRC(P ), SW (P ), and B(P ).
Remark 2. We can weaken the definition of strongly substitutable to: For all S and S ′,
with S = Ch(S, P (a)), S ′ = Ch(S ′, P (a)), and S ′P (a)S,
b ∈ Ch(S ′ ∪ b, P (a)) implies b ∈ Ch(S ∪ b, P (a)).
All our results go through under this weaker definition. We chose the stronger formulation
in our exposition to make the comparison with earlier work easier. But when we check
that an example violates strong substitutability, we actually check for the weaker version.
6.3 Discussion of strong substitutability
How strong is the assumption of strong substitutability? We lack a characterization of
strong substitutability—just as a characterization of traditional (Kelso-Crawford) sub-
stitutability is unavailable. But we give a feeling for the assumption by discussing pref-
erences that are built from preferences over individual workers.
First, strong substitutability is weaker than the assumption of separability used in
matching models (Dutta and Masso´, 1997; So¨nmez, 1996). Separability says that, for
any set of partners S, S ∪ bPS\b if and only if bP∅ (separability has been used quite
extensively in social choice theory; e.g. Barbera´, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991)). The
proof that separability implies strong substitutability is straightforward; we omit it.
Second, it is not stronger than responsiveness, another common assumption is the
matching literature (see Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for a definition of responsiveness).
One can easily write examples of non-responsive preferences that satisfy strong substi-
tutability.
Third, to give a feeling for how restrictive strong substitutability is, consider the
following example with four workers and a quota of 2. 1
Example 20. Let W = {w1, w2, w3, w4}. Suppose that a firm has preferences over
individual workers w1Pw2, w2Pw3 and w3Pw4.
1The right separability assumption for models with quotas is q-separability, developed by Mart´ınez,
Masso´, Neme, and Oviedo (2000). But q-separability does not imply strong substitutability.
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Suppose the firm has a quota of 2. So only sets with two or less elements are accept-
able. How can we rank the sets
{w1, w2} , {w1, w3} , {w1, w4} , {w2, w3} , {w2, w4} , {w3, w4}
building from the preferences over individuals? Obviously we need {w1, w2}P {w1, w3} ,
{w2, w3}P {w3, w4}, and so on. There are two possibilities:
P1 : w1w2, w1w3, w1w4, w2w3, w2w4, w3w4, w1, w2, w3, w4
P2 : w1w2, w1w3, w2w3, w1w4, w2w4, w3w4, w1, w2, w3, w4
The ranking of {w1, w4} and {w2, w3} is undetermined; P1 ranks {w1, w4} first,
P2 ranks {w2, w3} first. Both P1 and P2 are substitutable, but only P2 is strongly
substitutable: Note that w4 ∈ Ch({w1w4} , P1), and {w1, w4}P1 {w2, w3}, but w4 /∈
Ch({w2, w3} ∪ w4, P1). So P1 is not strongly substitutable. It is simple, if tedious, to
check that P2 is strongly substitutable.
Example 20 points to a general procedure for obtaining strongly substitutable pref-
erences from preferences over individuals when there is a quota. Let S, S ∪ bPS\b if and
only if {b}P∅ unless S and S ′ have the maximum number of elements allowed by the
quota. If S and S ′ have the maximum number of elements, let SPS ′ if the worst agent
in S is preferred to the worst agent in S ′.
Finally, a trivial but important point is that, in applications, the set of acceptable
partners is often quite small. And both substitutability and strong substitutability are
less restrictive if fewer sets of partners are acceptable (Remark 2). For example, the set
of acceptable hospitals in the National Resident Matching Program was on average 7.45,
out of 3719 programs, in 2003 (source: http://www.nrmp.org/). In a recent proposal
to match high schools and students in New York City by a Gale-Shapley algorithm, stu-
dents would be required to rank 12—out of over 200—acceptable high schools. Students
and parents complain that 12 is too long a list (New York Times story by David M.
Herszenhorn, “Revised Admission for High Schools,” on October 3rd, 2003).
A similar point is that several well-known examples in the literature have agents with
strongly substitutable preferences. Two such examples are 6.6 in Roth and Sotomayor
(1990) and 5.2 in Blair (1988).
6.4 Examples
Example 21 shows that C(PB) * S∗(P ).
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Example 21. Let F = {f1, f2, f3} and W = {w1, w2}, with preferences
P (f1) : w1w2
P (f2) : w1w2, w1, w2
P (f3) : w1w2, w1, w2
P (w1) : f1f2, f2f3, f1, f2, f3
P (w2) : f1f2, f2f3, f1, f2, f3.
Consider matchings µ and µ′ defined by
f1 f2 f3
µ = ∅ w1w2 w1w2
Then µ ∈ C(PB) but µ /∈ S∗(P ), as (f1, {w1, w2}) blocks* µ.
Strongly substitutable preferences imply—among other things—that there are setwise
stable matchings. Sotomayor (1999) presents an example where the set of setwise stable
matchings is empty. We reproduce her example in 22, and show that preferences in her
example are not strongly substitutable.
Preferences in Example 22 are substitutable. So the example shows that strong
substitutability is strictly stronger than substitutability.
Example 22. (Example 2 of Sotomayor (1999)) Each firm (worker) may form at most
qf (qw) partnerships. For each pair (f, w) there are two numbers afw and bfw. The
preferences of firms f and workers w over allowable sets of partners are determined by
these numbers. Therefore, say, f prefers w to w′ if and only if afw > afw′ , and w prefers
f to f ′ if and only if bfw > bf ′w. Say that f prefers the set S ⊆ W to the set S
′ ⊆ W if
and only if
∑
w∈S afw >
∑
w∈S′ afw.
Let F = {f1, f2, f3, f4, f5, f6} and W = {w1, w2, w3, w4, w5, w6, w7}. Let qf1 = 3,
qf2 = qf3 = 2, qf3 = qf4 = qf6 = 1, qw1 = qw2 = qw4 = 2, and qw3 = qw5 = qw6 = qw7 = 1.
The pairs of numbers (afw, bfw) are given in Table 1 below.
w1 w2 w3 w4 w5 w6 w7
f1 (13,1) (14,10) (4,10) (1,10) (0,0) (0,0) (3,10)
f2 (1,10) (0,0) (0,0) (10,1) (4,10) (2,10) (0,0)
f3 (10,4) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0)
f4 (10,2) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0)
f5 (0,0) (9,9) (0,0) (10,4) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0)
f6 (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (10,2) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0)
There are pairwise-stable matchings that are not setwise stable: Consider µ, defined
by
f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 f6
µ = w2w3w7 w5w6 w1 w1 w2w4 w4.
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It is easy to see that µ is pairwise-stable. But µ is not setwise stable: coalition {f1, f2, w1, w2}
causes an instability in µ.
The problem is that the resulting preference profile is not strongly substitutable:
Consider the preference of firm f1, we have that
{w1, w2}P (f1){w2, w3, w7},
(because 14+13 > 14+4+3), w4 ∈ Ch({w1, w2}∪{w4}, P (f1)) but w4 /∈ Ch({w2, w3, w7}∪
{w4}, P (f1)) = {w2, w3, w7} (because 14+4+3 > max{14+4+1, 14+3+1, 4+3+1} )
7 An implementation of SW (P )
We present a simple (non-cooperative) bargaining model. The set of subgame-perfect
Nash equilibrium (SPNE) outcomes of the model coincides with the setwise-stable set;
so the model fully implements SW (P ) in a complete-information environment.
Bargaining proceeds as follows: First, every firm f proposes a set of partners ηf ⊆
W . Firms make these proposals simultaneously. Second, after observing all the firms’
proposals, each worker w proposes a set of partners ξw ⊆ F . Workers make these
proposals simultaneously. Finally, a matching µ results by w ∈ µ(f) if and only if w ∈ ηf
and f ∈ ξw. In words, w and f are matched if and only if f proposes w as its partner,
and w proposes f as its partner.
A strategy for a firm f is a proposal ηf ⊆ W . Given a profile of firms’ proposals,
η = (ηf )f∈F , a strategy by a worker w is a proposal ξw(η) ⊆ F . A strategy profile (η, ξ)
is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) if for all w and f ,
ξw(η) ∩
{
f˜ : w ∈ ηf˜
}
R(w)A,
for all A ⊆
{
f˜ : w ∈ ηf˜
}
; and if
ηf ∩
{
w : f ∈ ξf (η)
}
R(f)A ∩
{
w : f ∈ ξf (A, η−f )
}
,
for all A ⊆ W . In words, (η, ξ) is a SPNE if ξw(η) is an optimal proposal, given firms’
proposal η, and ηf is optimal given the other firms’ proposals η−f , and workers’ proposals.
Theorem 23. Let P (W ) be substitutable. A matching µ is the outcome of a subgame-
perfect Nash equilibrium if and only if µ ∈ E.
Theorems 18 and 23 imply
Corollary 24. Let P (F ) be substitutable and P (W ) be strongly substitutable A matching
µ is the outcome of a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium if and only if µ ∈ SW (P ).
The implication of Theorem 23 and Corollary 24 is that the setwise-stable matchings
are exactly those consistent with a basic non-cooperative bargaining model. Thus core
matchings, for example, are not guaranteed to be SPNE outcomes.
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8 Blocks of setwise-stable matchings.
In Example 1, µˆ blocks µ through a coordinated, and non-individually-rational, effort of
all agents. The preferences in Example 1 exhibit agents a who want agents b, where b
dislikes a but is willing to accept a if she gets c, who dislikes b, and so on until a cycle is
closed. We shall call such a cycle an acceptance-rejection cycle.
We now show that a matching in E can, in fact, only be blocked through an effort of
this kind.
Definition 25. Let µ be a matching. An agent a wants to add an agent b to her partners
if
b ∈ Ch(µ(a) ∪ b, P (a)).
An alternating sequence of workers and firms
(w0, f0, w1, f1, . . . wK , fK)
is an acceptance-rejection cycle for µ if, for k with 0 ≤ k ≤ K − 1, wk wants to add fk to
her partners but fk does not want to add wk, while fk want to add wk+1 to her partners,
and wk+1 does not want to add fk.
Theorem 26. Let P be substitutable. If µ ∈ E, and 〈W ′, F ′, µ′〉 is a block of µ, then
there is an acceptance-rejection cycle for µ in µ′(W ′ ∪ F ′)\µ(W ′ ∪ F ′).
Corollary 27. Let P (F ) be substitutable, and P (W ) strongly substitutable. If µ ∈
SW (P ), and 〈W ′, F ′, µ′〉 is a block of µ, then there is an acceptance-rejection cycle for µ
in µ′(W ′ ∪ F ′)\µ(W ′ ∪ F ′).
9 Lattice Structure
9.1 Partial Orders.
We shall introduce two partial orders on V . The first (Definition 28) is the partial order
introduced by Blair (1988). The second (Definition 29) is the canonical partial order on
matchings from one-to-one theory.
Definition 28. Define the following partial orders on VF , VW V :
1. <BF on VF by ν
′
F <
B
F νF if and only if ν
′
F 6= νF and, for all f in F , νF (f) = ν
′
F (f)
or
νF (f) = Ch (νF (f) ∪ ν
′
F (f) , P (f)) .
2. <BW on VW by ν
′
W <
B
W νW if and only if ν
′
W 6= νW and, for all w in W , νW (w) =
ν ′W (w) or
νW (f) = Ch (νW (w) ∪ ν
′
W (w) , P (w)) .
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3. The weak partial orders associated to <BF and <
B
W are denoted ≤
B
F and ≤
B
W , and
defined as: ν ′F ≤
B
F νF if νF = ν
′
F or ν
′
F <
B
F νF , and ν
′
W ≤
B
W νW if νW = ν
′
W or
ν ′W <
B
W νW .
4. ≤BF on V by ν
′ ≤BF ν iff νW ≤
B
W ν
′
W and ν
′
F ≤
B
F νF . The strict version of ≤
B
F on V
is ν ′ <B ν if ν ′ ≤B ν and ν ′ 6= ν.
5. ≤BW on V by ν
′ ≤BW ν iff ν ≤
B
F ν
′.
Definition 29. Define the following partial orders on VF , VW and V :
1. ≤F on VF by ν
′
F ≤F νF if νF (f)R(f)ν
′
F (f), for all f ∈ F . The strict version of ≤F
on VF is ν
′
F <F νF if ν
′
F ≤F νF and ν
′
F 6= νF .
2. ≤W on VW by ν
′
W ≤W νW if νF (w)R(w)ν
′
W (w), for all w ∈ W . The strict version
of ≤W on VW is ν
′
W <W νW if ν
′
W ≤W νW and ν
′
W 6= νW .
3. ≤F on V by ν
′ ≤F ν iff νW ≤W ν
′
W and ν
′
F ≤F νF . The strict version of ≤ on V is
ν ′ < ν if ν ′ ≤ ν and ν ′ 6= ν.
4. ≤W on V by ν
′ ≤W ν iff ν ≤F ν
′.
Definitions 28 and 29 abuse notation in using each symbol (≤BF , ≤F , ≤
B
W , and ≤W )
for two different orders. The abuse of notation does not—we believe—confuse.
To simplify the notation in the sequel, let (≤B,≤) ∈
{
(≤BF ,≤F ), (≤
B
W ,≤W )
}
. All
statements that follow are true both with (≤B,≤) = (≤BF ,≤F ) and (≤
B,≤) = (≤BW ,≤W ).
Remark 3. ≤B is a coarser order than ≤, as ν ′ ≤B ν implies that ν ′ ≤ ν.
Remark 4. 〈V ,≤F 〉 is a lattice (see Remark 1), and the lattice operations are
ν ∨F ν
′ (f) =
{
ν(f) if ν(f)R(f)ν ′(f)
ν ′(f) if ν ′(f)P (f)ν(f)
and
ν ∨F ν
′ (w) =
{
ν ′(w) if ν(w)R(w)ν ′(w)
ν(w) if ν ′(w)P (w)ν(w).
ν ∧F ν
′ is defined symmetrically; giving f the worst of ν(f) and ν ′(f), and giving w the
best of ν(w) and ν ′(w).
〈V ,≤W 〉 is a lattice, and the lattice operations are analogous to ∨F and ∧F .
Blair’s order incorporates strong substitutability:
Proposition 30. If P (a) is substitutable, then PB(a) is strongly substitutable.
Proof. Let b ∈ Ch (S ′ ∪ b, P (a)) and S ′PB(a)S. Note that
b ∈ Ch (S ′ ∪ b, P (a)) = Ch (Ch(S ∪ S ′, P (a)) ∪ b, P (a))
= Ch (S ∪ S′ ∪ w,P (f))
Where the first equality is by definition of PB and the second equality is a prop-
erty of choice. Finally, b ∈ Ch (S ∪ S ′ ∪ b, P (a)) and substitutability implies that
b ∈ Ch (S ′ ∪ b, P (a)).
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9.2 Lattice Structure
With substitutable preferences, T is a monotone increasing map under order ≤B. Tarski’s
fixed point theorem then delivers a lattice structure on E . With strongly substitutable
preferences, T is a monotone increasing map under order ≤. Tarski’s fixed point theorem
gives a lattice structure on E under order ≤. We discuss the implications below.
Theorem 31. Let P be substitutable. Then
1. 〈E ,≤B〉 is a non-empty lattice;
2. the T -algorithm starting at ν0 stops at inf≤B
F
E, and the T -algorithm starting at ν1
stops at sup≤B
F
E.
Further, if P is strongly substitutable, 〈E ,≤〉 is a non-empty lattice, inf≤B
F
E = inf≤F E,
and sup≤B
F
E = sup≤F E.
Theorem 32. Let P (F ) be substitutable and P (W ) be strongly substitutable. Then
1. if ν, ν ′ ∈ E are such that ν ′(w)R(w)ν(w) for all w ∈W , then ν(f)R(f)ν ′(f) for all
f ∈ F .
2. Further, let P (F ) be strongly substitutable. If ν, ν ′ ∈ E are such that ν ′(f)R(f)ν(f)
for all f ∈ F , then ν(w)R(w)ν ′(w) for all w ∈ W .
By definition of ≤BF , ≤F , ≤
B
W , and ≤W , we get inf≤F E = sup≤W E , inf≤W E = sup≤F E ,
inf≤B
F
E = sup≤B
W
E , and inf≤B
W
E = sup≤B
F
E .
Theorem 31 implies Theorem 19. It also implies
Corollary 33. If P (F ) is substitutable, and P (W ) is strongly substitutable, then 〈SW (P ),≤B
〉 = 〈B(P ),≤B〉 = 〈S(P ),≤B〉 are non-empty lattices. Further, if P (F ) is strongly sub-
stitutable, 〈SW (P ),≤〉 = 〈B(P ),≤〉 = 〈S(P ),≤〉 are non-empty lattices
Theorems 31 and 32 have an interpretation in terms of worker-firm “conflict” and
worker-worker (or firm-firm) “coincidence” of interests (Roth, 1985).
First, Theorem 31 implies that there are two distinguished matchings in E . One is
simultaneously better for all firms, and worse for all workers, than any other matching in
E . The other is simultaneously worse for all firms, and better for all workers, than any
other matching in E . The lattice structure thus implies a coincidence-of-interest property.
Second, Theorem 32 reflects a worker-firm conflict of interest; for any two matchings
in E , if one is better for all firms it must also be worse for all workers, and vice versa.
Roth (1985) proved that Statement 1 in Theorem 32 holds in the one-to-one model and
in the many-to-one model. Roth also proved that Statement 2 in Theorem 32 holds in
the one-to-one model. Here we extend Roth’s results, as workers’ preferences are trivially
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strongly substitutable in the many-to-one model, and all agents’ preferences are trivially
strongly substitutable in the one-to-one model. 2
In light of Theorem 15, Theorem 33 implies that 〈S(P ),≤BF 〉 is a lattice when pref-
erences are substitutable—a result first proved by Blair (1988). Blair shows with an
example that 〈S(P ),≤F 〉 may not be a lattice. Preferences in Blair’s example are not
strongly substitutable; we discuss Blair’s example in Section 9.4.
In the one-to-one model, the lattice-structure of 〈S(P ),≤F 〉 is known since at least
Knuth (1976) (Knuth attributes the result to J. Conway). Theorem 31 extends the
result to the many-to-many model, as preferences are trivially strongly substitutable in
the one-to-one model.
9.3 Further conflict/coincidence properties
There are two additional features of many-to-one and one-to-one matchings that merit
attention.
9.3.1 Stronger coincidence-of-interest property
Roth (1985) presents a stronger version of the coincidence-of-interest property implicit
in the result that 〈E ,≤BF 〉 is a lattice. He proves that, if µ and µ
′ are pairwise-stable
matchings in the many-to-one model, the matching that gives each firm f its best subset
out of µ(f) ∪ µ′(f) is stable, and worse than both µ and µ′ for all workers.
Roth’s stronger coincidence of interest property does not extend to the many-to-
many model with strongly substitutable preferences. Example 5.2 in Blair (1988) is a
counterexample—we discuss this example in Section 9.4.
But note
Proposition 34. Let P (F ) be substitutable. Let µ, µ′ ∈ S(P ). Define the matching µˆ by
µˆ(f) = Ch(µ(f) ∪ µ′(f), P (f)), for all f ∈ F . If µˆ(w) ∈ {µ(w), µ′(w)}, for all w ∈ W ,
then µˆ ∈ S(P ). Further, if P (W ) is substitutable, µ(w)R(w)µˆ(w) and µ′(w)R(w)µˆ(w),
for all w ∈W .
Proof. The proof that µˆ ∈ S(P ) is a minor variation of Roth’s (1985) proof of the
coincidence-of-interest property in the many-to-one model.
First, µˆ is individually rational: µ and µ′ are individually rational so µˆ(w) = Ch(µˆ(w), P (w))
for all w; by definition of µˆ, µˆ(f) = Ch(µˆ(f), P (f)) for all f .
2By Proposition 30, we also extend Blair’s (1988) version of Roth’s result (Blair’s Lemmas 4.3 and 4.4).
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Second, there are not pairwise blocks of µˆ. If (w, f) is a pairwise block of µˆ. Then w /∈
µˆ(f), f ∈ Ch(µˆ(w) ∪ f, P (w)), and w ∈ Ch(µˆ(f) ∪w,P (f)). Without loss of generality,
let µˆ(w) = µ(w). So f /∈ µ(w) and f ∈ Ch(µ(w)∪f, P (w)). But w ∈ Ch(µˆ(f)∪w,P (f))
implies
w ∈ Ch (Ch (µ(f) ∪ µ′(f), P (f)) ∪ w,P (f)) = Ch (µ(f) ∪ µ′(f) ∪ w,P (f)) .
By substitutability of P (f), w ∈ Ch(µ(f)∪w,P (f)). Then f /∈ µ(w) and f ∈ Ch(µ(w)∪
f, P (w)) implies that (w, f) is also a pairwise block of µ.
So µ, µ′ ∈ S(P ) implies that there are no pairwise blocks of µˆ.
When P (W ) is substitutable, S(P ) = E and it is routine to verify that
µˆ(w) ⊆ V (w, µˆ) ⊆ V (w, µ) ∩ V (w, µ′).
Then µ, µ′ ∈ E implies that µ(w)R(w)µˆ(w) and µ′(w)R(w)µˆ(w).
In light of Proposition 34, what seems to be behind Roth’s result is the many-to-
one-ness of the many-to-one model; it does not seem that we can capture the stronger
coincidence-of-interest property in a many-to-many model.
9.3.2 Distributive property of lattice operations
The set of stable matchings in the one-to-one model is a distributive lattice (Knuth,
1976). The distributive property of the one-to-one model does not extend to our many-
to-many model: In Blair’s (1988) Example 5.2, the set of stable many-to-many matchings
is not a distributive lattice, and all agents’ preferences in Blair’s example satisfy strong
substitutability (see Section 9.4).
We identify why the distributive property fails in the many-to-many model. The
problem is that the lattice operations (see Remark 4) in 〈V ,≤〉 may not preserve the
property that matchings in E are matchings—not only prematchings. That is, if µ∨µ′ ∈
M and µ ∧ µ′ ∈ M for all µ and µ′ in E , then 〈E ,≤F 〉 is a distributive lattice. This
result does extend the one-to-one result.
Let us order V by set-inclusion; let ν ′ v ν if ν ′(f) ⊆ ν(f) and ν(w) ⊆ ν ′(w), for
all f and w. Then 〈V ,v〉 is a lattice (see Remark 1). The lattice operations are t and
u, defined by (ν t ν ′)(f) = ν(f) ∪ ν ′(f), and (ν u ν ′)(f) = ν(f) ∩ ν ′(f), for all f , and
(ν t ν ′)(w) = ν(w) ∩ ν ′(w), and (ν u ν ′)(w) = ν(w) ∪ ν ′(w), for all w.
Let ψ : V → V be
(ψν)(a) =
{
U(f, ν) if a = f ∈ F
V (w, ν) if a = w ∈W
22
Theorem 35. Let P be strongly substitutable. The map ψ is a lattice homomorphism of
〈V ,≤〉 into 〈V ,v〉. Further, if µ ∨ µ′ ∈M and µ ∧ µ′ ∈M for all µ, µ′ ∈ E, then
1. 〈E ,≤〉 is a distributive sublattice of 〈V ,≤〉,
2. ψ|E is a lattice isomorphism of 〈E ,≤〉 onto 〈ψE ,v〉.
The partial order ≤ on V depends on the profile P of preferences. In Theorem 35,
we translate ≤ into an order that does not depend on P : set-inclusion. We interpret the
result as showing how the lattice structure on V and, under additional assumptions, E is
inherited from the lattice structure of set inclusion.
The interest of Theorem 35 is, first, that it shows why distributivity fails in the many-
to-many model. Second, it shows how the distributive property in the one-to-one model
is inherited from the distributive property of set inclusion on V ; it is easy to verify that
the one-to-one model satisfies that µ ∨ µ′ ∈M and µ ∧ µ′ ∈M for all µ, µ′ ∈ E . In fact
the verification is carried out in Knuth (1976, page 56), as a first step in the proof that
〈S(P ),≤F 〉 is a distributive lattice.
Note that 〈E ,≤F 〉 being a sub-lattice of 〈V ,≤F 〉 means that the lattice operations ∨F
and ∧F on 〈V ,≤F 〉 (see Remark 4) are also the lattice operations of 〈E ,≤F 〉. Mart´ınez,
Masso´, Neme, and Oviedo (2001) assuming substitutable (and q-separable) preferences,
show that the stable matchings are not a lattice under ∨F and ∧F .
9.4 Examples 5.1 and 5.2 in Blair (1988)
We do not reproduce the examples here.
Blair presents Example 5.1 as an example where 〈S(P ),≤〉 is not a lattice. In Example
5.1 there are 13 firms and 12 workers; F = {1, 2, . . . 13}, W = {a, b, . . . q}. Firm 10’s
preference relation is not strongly substitutable:
P (10) : mp, bnp,m, . . . ,
where . . . means that there are other acceptable sets of workers not listed. Note that
{b, n, p}P (10) {m} and b ∈ Ch({b, n, p}∪{b} , P (10)), but that b ∈ Ch({m}∪{b} , P (10)) =
{m}.
Thus Blair’s Example 5.1 illustrates that, with non-strongly substitutable preferences,
〈E ,≤〉 may not be a lattice.
Blair presents Example 5.2 as an example where 〈S(P ),≤B〉 is not a distributive
lattice. Preferences in Example 5.2 are strongly substitutable—this is easy, if tedious, to
verify. Blair’s example thus illustrates that 〈E ,≤〉 and 〈E ,≤B〉 may not be distributive
lattices (the lattice operations in 〈E ,≤〉 and 〈E ,≤B〉 might not coincide, but in this
example they do).
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We show that Example 5.2 does not satisfy the property that µ ∨ µ′ ∈ M and
µ ∧ µ′ ∈M for all µ, µ′ ∈ E . So the example is not in the hypotheses of Theorem 35.
In Example 5.2 there are 7 firms and 10 workers; F = {1, 2, . . . 7}, W = {a, b, . . . j}.
Consider matchings
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
µ1 bcd ae af j h i g,
µ2 bcd ae i ag h f j.
Then µ1 ∨ µ2 is:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
µ1 ∨ µ2 bcd ae i j h f g
a b c d e f g h i j
µ1 ∨ µ2 24 1 1 1 2 6 7 5 3 4.
But µ1 ∨ µ2 is not a matching, as 4 ∈ µ1 ∨ µ2(a) while a /∈ µ1 ∨ µ2(4).
Finally, we show that Blair’s Example 5.2 also violates Roth’s stronger conflict-of-
interest property. From µ1 and µ2, constructing matching µˆ by µˆ(f) = Ch(µ1(f) ∪
µ2(f), P (f)), for all f , gives
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
µˆ bcd ae i j h f g.
Now, µˆ is blocked by the pair (1, a), so µˆ is not pairwise stable. Note that µˆ(a) =
{2} /∈ {µ1(a), µ2(a)}. Thus Example 5.2 is not in the hypotheses of Proposition 34.
10 Proof of Theorem 15
The following proposition is immediate, but useful in some of our proofs.
Proposition 36. A pair (B, f) ∈ 2W × F blocks* µ if and only if, for all w ∈ B, there
is Dw ⊆ µ (w) such that
[Dw ∪ f ]P (w)µ(w),
and there is A ⊆ µ (f) such that
[A ∪B]P (f)µ (f) .
In words, (B, f) blocks* µ if firm f is willing to hire the workers in B—possibly after
firing some of its current workers in µ(f)—and all workers w in B prefer f , possibly after
rejecting some of the firms in µ (w).
We present the proof of Theorem 15 in a series of lemmas. The first statement in
Theorem 15 follows because S∗∗(P ) ⊆ S∗(P ) is immediate, and from Lemmas 37 and 39.
Item i) of the theorem follows from Lemmas 40 and 41. Item ii) follows from Lemma 42,
and from Theorem 31.
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Lemma 37. S∗(P ) ⊆ S(P )
Proof. Let µ /∈ S(P ). We shall prove that µ /∈ S∗(P ). If µ is not individually rational
there is nothing to prove; assume then that µ is individually rational. µ /∈ S(P ) implies
that there is (w, f) ∈W × F such that w /∈ µ (f) (or f /∈ µ (w)),
f ∈ Ch(µ(w) ∪ {f}, P (w)) (1)
w ∈ Ch (µ (f) ∪ {w}, P (f)) . (2)
Statements (1), (2), and w /∈ µ (f) imply that
Ch (µ (w) ∪ {f}, P (w))P (w)µ (w) (3)
and
Ch (µ (f) ∪ {w}, P (f))P (f)µ (f) . (4)
Let B = {w}, Dw = Ch (µ (w) ∪ {f}, P (w)) ∩ µ (w) , and
A = Ch (µ (f) ∪ {w}, P (f)) ∩ µ (f) .
We shall prove that (B, f) blocks* µ. Since B = {w}, statement (3) implies that
Dw = Ch (µ (w) ∪ {f}, P (w)) ∩ µ (w)
= Ch (µ (w) ∪ {f}, P (w)) \{f}.
So statement (3) implies that
[Dw ∪ {f}] = Ch (µ (w) ∪ {f}, P (w))P (w)µ (w) ,
which gives us the first part of the definition of block*. Also,
A = Ch (µ (f) ∪ {w}, P (f)) ∩ µ (f)
= Ch (µ (f) ∪ {w}, P (f)) \{w}
= Ch (µ (f) ∪ {w}, P (f)) \B.
So statement (4) implies that
[A ∪B] = Ch (µ (f) ∪ {w}, P (f))P (f)µ (f) ,
and we have the second part of the definition of block*. Thus, µ /∈ S∗ (P ).
Remark 5. In general, S∗ (P ) 6= S (P ).
We use Lemma 38 in many of our results, starting with Lemma 39.
Lemma 38. If ν ∈ E then ν is a matching and ν is individually rational.
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Proof. Let ν = (νF , νW ) ∈ E .
Fix w ∈ νF (f), we shall prove that f ∈ νW (w). ν ∈ E implies that
w ∈ νF (f) = (Tν) (f) = Ch (U (f, ν) , P (f)) .
Thus w ∈ U(f, ν).
The definition of U(f, ν) implies
f ∈ Ch (νW (w) ∪ {f}, P (w))R (w) νW (w) . (5)
Now, νF (f) ∪ {w} = νF (f) and ν ∈ E , imply that
νF (f) = (Tν) (f) = Ch(U(f, ν), P (f)). (6)
So
Ch (νF (f) , P (f))
(1)
= Ch (Ch (U (f, ν) , P (f)) , P (f))
(2)
= Ch (U (f, ν) , P (f))
(3)
= νF (f) .
Equalities (1) and (3) follow from statement (6). Equality (2) is a simple property of
choice sets: Ch (Ch (S, P (f)) , P (f)) = Ch (S, P (f)). Hence we have that
νF (f) = Ch(νF (f) , P (f)). (7)
Now w ∈ νF (f) implies that Ch(νF (f) , P (f)) = Ch(νF (f)∪{w}, P (f)). So statement
(7) implies that
f ∈ V (w, ν). (8)
But
νW (w) = (Tν)(w) = Ch (V (w, ν) , P (w)) ,
so
νW (w) ⊆ V (w, ν) . (9)
But statements (8) and (9) give
V (w, ν) ⊇ νW (w) ∪ {f} ⊇ Ch (νW (w) ∪ {f}, P (w)) .
The definition of choice set implies
νW (w)R (w)Ch (νW (w) ∪ {f}, P (w)) . (10)
Statements (5), (10) and anti-symmetry of preference relations imply that, f ∈ νW (w).
Let f ∈ νW (w), the proof that w ∈ νF (f) and that
νF (f) = Ch(νF (f), P (f)) (11)
is entirely symmetric to the proof for workers above.
Thus, w ∈ vF (f) if and only if f = vW (w). So, ν is a matching.
Statements (7) and (11) imply that ν is individually rational.
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Lemma 39. E ⊆ S∗∗(P )
Proof. Let µ ∈ E . By Lemma 38 we know that µ is an individually rational matching. Fix
f ∈ F, B ⊆ W such that B 6= ∅. We assume that, for all w ∈ B there exist Dw ⊆ µ (w)
such that {f} ∪DwP (w)µ (w) . µ is individually rational, so µ(f) = Ch(µ, P (f)). Then
{f} ∪DwP (w)µ (w) implies that
f ∈ Ch (µ (w) ∪ {f} , P (w)) ; (12)
for all w ∈ B. By the definition of U (f, µ), we have that
B ⊆ U (f, µ) . (13)
Let A ⊆ µ (f). µ ∈ E implies that µ(f) = (Tµ)(f) ⊆ U(f, µ); so statement (13) gives
A ∪B ⊆ U(f, µ). (14)
Now, µ ∈ E and statement (14) implies
µ (f)R (f)Ch (A ∪B,P (f))R (f) [A ∪B] ; (15)
as µ (f) = Ch (U (f, µ) , P (f)).
Statements (12) and (15) show that there is no (B, f) that blocks* µ. The proof that
there is no (w,A) ∈ W × 2F that blocks* µ is symmetric. Thus µ ∈ S∗∗ (P ).
Lemma 40. If P (W ) is substitutable, S∗(P ) ⊆ E
Proof. Let µ ∈ S∗ (P ) and assume that µ /∈ E , so µ 6= Tµ. We shall first prove that
(Tµ)(f) 6= µ(f), for some f , yields a contradiction, and then that (Tµ)(w) 6= µ(w), for
some w, yields a contradiction. Note that, by the asymmetric situation of firms and
workers in the definition of S∗(P ), the proof of the two statements is not analogous.
First assume that there exist f ∈ F such that
µ (f) 6= (Tµ) (f) = Ch (U (f, µ) , P (f)) = C ⊆ U (f, µ) .
Let A = C ∩ µ (f) , and B = C\µ (f) . Because µ is an individually rational matching
we have that µ(w) = Ch(µ(w), P (w)) = Ch(µ(w) ∪ w,P (w)), for all w ∈ µ(f). Hence,
µ(f) ⊆ U(f, µ), so (Tµ)(f)P (f)µ(f) implies that B 6= ∅.
Now,
A ∪B = CP (f)µ (f) . (16)
Also, for all w ∈ B, w ∈ U (f, µ); so f ∈ Ch (µ (w) ∪ f, P (w)) by the definition of
U(f, µ). For any w ∈ B let Dw = Ch (µ (w) ∪ f, P (w))∩µ (w). Since f /∈ µ (w) we have
that
{f} ∪DwP (w)µ (w) . (17)
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Statements (16) and (17) imply that (B, f) block* µ, which contradicts that µ ∈ S∗(P ).
Hence, for all f ∈ F ,
µ (f) = (Tµ) (f) . (18)
Now assume that there exists w ∈ W such that
µ (w) 6= (Tµ) (w) = Ch (V (w, µ) , P (w)) = G ⊆ V (w, µ) .
If f ∈ G, then
w ∈ Ch (µ (f) ∪ {w}, P (f)) , (19)
by the definition on V (w, µ). Because µ is an individually rational matching we have—by
the same argument as above—that µ (w) ⊆ V (w, µ) . We can assume that G * µ(w);
for, if G ⊆ µ(w), then µ (w) ⊆ V (w, µ) and the Choice Property,3 imply that
G = Ch (V (w, µ) , P (w)) = Ch (µ (w) , P (w)) = µ (w) ,
where the last equality follows because µ is an individually rational matching—but this
would contradict that G 6= µ (w) , hence we can assume G * µ(w).
Let f ∈ G\µ (w). µ is a matching, so w /∈ µ(f). Now, statement (19) implies that
w ∈ Ch
(
µ
(
f
)
∪ {w}, P
(
f
))
= C.
Let A = C ∩ µ (f) = C\{w}, and B = {w}. Then
C = [A ∪B]P (f)µ (f) . (20)
Now, f ∈ G\µ (w) ; so substitutability of P (w) implies that there existsDw = Ch (V (w, µ) , P (w))∩
µ (w) such that [
f ∪Dw
]
P (w)µ (w) . (21)
Statements (20) and (21) imply that
(
f, {w}
)
blocks* µ, which contradicts µ ∈ S∗(P ).
Hence, for all w ∈W ,
µ (w) = (Tµ) (w) . (22)
Statements (18) and (22) imply that µ = Tµ. Hence µ ∈ E .
Lemma 41. If P (W ) is substitutable then S∗ (P ) ⊆ C(PB).
Proof. Let µ ∈ S∗ (P ), and suppose that µ /∈ C(PB). Let F ′ ⊆ F , W ′ ⊆ W with
F ′ ∪W ′ 6= ∅, and let µˆ ∈M such that, for all w ∈W ′, and for all f ∈ F ′
µˆ(w) ⊆ F ′, and µˆ(f) ⊆ W ′, (23)
3Ch (A,P (s)) ⊆ B ⊆ A, then Ch (A,P (s)) = Ch (B,P (s))
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µˆ(w)RB(w)µ(w), (24)
µˆ(f)RB(f)µ(f), (25)
and
µˆ(s)PB(s)µ(s) for at least one s ∈ W ′ ∪ F ′.
We shall need the following
Claim. There exists f ∈ F ′, such that µˆ(f)PB(f)µ(f) if and only if there exists
w ∈ W ′ such that µˆ(w)PB(w)µ(w).
Proof of the claim. Let µˆ(f)PB(f)µ(f). Because µ is individually rational,
we have that µˆ(f) * µ(f), so let w ∈ µˆ(f)\µ(f). By condition (23), we have that
w ∈ µˆ(f) ⊆ W ′; but then w /∈ µ(f) and condition (24 ) implies that
µˆ(w)PB(w)µ(w).
Similarly we show that if µˆ(w)PB(w)µ(w) then there exist f such that µˆ(f)PB(f)µ(f).
This proves the claim.
By the claim, we can assume that there exists f ∈ F ′ such that µˆ(f) 6= µ(f). Let
B = µˆ(f)\µ(f) and A = µˆ(f) ∩ µ(f) then
A ∪B = µˆ(f)PB(f)µ(f), (26)
and B ∩ µ (f) = ∅. Let w ∈ B. Then, f ∈ µˆ(w) and f /∈ µ(w), which implies that
µˆ(w) 6= µ (w) . Condition (24) implies that
f ∈ µˆ(w) = Ch(µ(w) ∪ µˆ(w), P (w)).
By substitutability of P (w), f ∈ Ch(µ(w) ∪ f), P (w).
Now, w ∈ B was arbitrary, so together with statement (26), this implies that (B, f)
blocks* µ. Thus µ /∈ S∗(P ).
Lemma 42. If P is substitutable then S(P ) ⊆ E
Proof. Let µ /∈ E . We shall prove that µ /∈ S(P ). If µ is not individually rational there
is nothing to prove. Suppose then that µ is individually rational. Lemma 40 and µ /∈ E
imply µ /∈ S∗(P ). So, there is (f,B), with B 6= ∅ that blocks* µ. This means that, for
all w ∈ B,
f ∈ Ch(µ(w) ∪ f, P (w))
and
B ⊆ Ch(µ(f) ∪B,P (f)).
But P (f) is substitutable, so there is w′ ∈ B with
w′ ∈ Ch(µ(f) ∪ w′, P (f)).
. Thus µ /∈ S(P ).
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11 Proof of Theorems 18 and 19
The proof of Theorem 18 follows from Lemmas 43, 44, 45, 46, and 47. Theorem 19 then
follows from Theorem 31.
Lemma 43. SW (P ) ⊆ E.
Proof. Let µ be a matching such that µ /∈ E . We shall prove that µ /∈ SW (P ). If µ is
not individually rational there is nothing to prove. Suppose then that µ is individually
rational matching.
Suppose, without loss of generality, that there is a f ∈ F such that µ(f) 6= Ch(U(f, µ), P (f)).
That µ is individually rational implies that µ(f) ⊆ U(f, µ) since, for all w ∈ µ(f),
f ∈ µ(w) so
Ch(µ(w) ∪ f, P (w)) = Ch(µ(w), P (w)) = µ(w) 3 f.
Let F ′ =
{
f
}
, let W ′ = Ch(U(f, µ), P (f))\µ(f). We shall construct a µ′ ∈ M such
that 〈W ′, F ′, µ′〉 is a set-wise block of µ. Let µ′(f) = Ch(U(f, µ), P (f)). For all w ∈W ,
let
µ′(w) =


Ch(µ(w) ∪ f, P (w)) if w ∈W ′
µ(w) if w ∈
[
µ′(f) ∩ µ(f)
]
∪
[
µ′(f) ∪ µ(f)
]c
µ(w)\f if w ∈ µ(f)\µ′(f)
µ′(f), for f /∈ F ′, is determined from the µ′(w)’s. Then µ′ is a matching and W ′ =
µ′(F )\µ(F ). Note that µ(f) ⊆ U(f, µ) implies that f ∈ Ch(µ(w)∪f, P (w)), so f ∈ µ′(w)
for all w ∈ W ′. So F ′ = µ′(W )\µ(W ).
First we verify that µ′ is individually rational: µ′(f) = Ch(µ′(f), P (f)), as µ′(f) =
Ch(U(f, µ), P (f)); and µ′(w) = Ch(µ′(w), P (f)), as µ′(w) = Ch(µ(w) ∪ f, P (f)) for all
w ∈ W ′.
Finally, µ(f) ⊆ U(f, µ) implies that µ′(f)P (f)µ(f), and µ′(w) = Ch(µ(w)∪ f, P (f))
implies that µ′(w)P (w)µ(w), for all w ∈ W ′. Thus the constructed 〈W ′, F ′, µ′〉 is a
set-wise block of µ, and thus µ /∈ SW (P ).
Lemma 44. B(P ) ⊆ E.
Proof. Let µ be a matching such that µ /∈ E . We shall prove that µ /∈ B(P ). If µ is
not individually rational there is nothing to prove. Suppose then that µ is individually
rational.
Suppose, without loss of generality, that there is a f ∈ F such that µ(f) 6= Ch(U(f, µ), P (f)).
Let F ′ =
{
f
}
, let
W ′ = Ch(U(f, µ), P (f))\µ(f).
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Construct µ′ as in the proof of Lemma 43. We shall prove that 〈W ′, F ′, µ′〉 is a counterobjection-
free objection. Recall that
µ′(f) = Ch(U(f, µ), P (f)). (27)
Note that µ(f) ⊆ U(f, µ) (see the proof of Lemma 43). So Statement 27 implies that
µ′(f)P (f)µ(f). Similarly, W ′ ⊆ U(f, µ) implies that µ′(w) = Ch(µ(w) ∪ f)P (w)µ(w)
for all w ∈ W ′. Hence 〈W ′, F ′, µ′〉 is an objection.
We now prove that there are no counterobjections to 〈W ′, F ′, µ′〉. Let 〈W ′′, F ′′, µ′′〉 be
such that µ′′ is a matching, F ′′ ⊆ F ′, W ′′ ⊆ W ′, and µ′′(W ′′∪F ′′)\µ′(W ′′∪F ′′) ⊆ W ′′∪F ′′.
First, let F ′′ 6= ∅. Then F ′′ =
{
f
}
. Statement 27 implies that µ′(f)R(f)A, for all
A ⊆ µ′(f). But
µ′′(f)\µ′(f) ⊆ W ′ ⊆ µ′(f).
So µ′(f)R(f)µ′′(f). Thus 〈W ′′, F ′′, µ′′〉 is not a counterobjection.
Second, let F ′′ = ∅. For all w ∈ W ′′, w ∈ U(f, µ). So
f ∈ Ch(µ(w) ∪ f, P (w)) = µ′(w) (28)
(see the proof of Lemma 43). Also, µ′′(w) ⊆ µ′(w), as µ′′(W ′′)\µ′(W ′′) ⊆ F ′′∅. Then
f /∈ µ′′(w) and Statement 28 implies that µ′(w)P (w)µ′′(w). Thus 〈W ′′, F ′′, µ′′〉 is not a
counterobjection.
Lemma 45. If P (F ) is substitutable, and P (W ) is strongly substitutable, then E ⊆
SW (P ).
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 47. Let µ ∈ E . By Lemma 38, µ is an
individually rational matching. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that µ /∈ SW (P ). Let
〈W ′, F ′, µ′〉 be a set-wise block of µ.
Fix f ∈ F ′, so µ′(f)P (f)µ(f). The matching µ is individually rational, so µ′(f)P (f)µ(f)
implies that
Ch(µ(f) ∪ µ′(f), P (f)) * µ(f)
Fix w ∈ Ch(µ(f) ∪ µ′(f) such that w ∈ µ′(f)\µ(f). By substitutability of P (f), w ∈
Ch(µ(f) ∪ w,P (f)). So
f ∈ V (w, µ). (29)
On the other hand, w ∈ µ′(f)\µ(f) implies that f ∈W ′, so
µ′(f)P (f)µ(f). (30)
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〈W ′, F ′, µ′〉 is a set-wise block, so µ′(w) = Ch(µ′(w), P (w)). Further, µ′ is a matching so
f ∈ µ′(w). Then Ch(µ′(w)∪f, P (w)). Strong substitutability of P (w) and Statement 30
implies that
f ∈ Ch(µ(w) ∪ f). (31)
But Statement 29 and µ ∈ E imply that µ(w) ∪ f ⊆ V (w, µ). But then Statement 31
contradicts that µ(w) = Ch(V (w, µ), P (w)).
Lemma 46. If P (F ) is substitutable, and P (W ) is strongly substitutable, then E ⊆ B(P ).
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 47. Let µ ∈ E . By Lemma 38, µ is an
individually rational matching. Let 〈W ′, F ′, µ′〉 be an objection to µ.
First, if µ′(s) 6= Ch(µ′(s), P (s)) for some s ∈ F ′∪W ′, then 〈W ′, F ′, µ′〉 has a counter-
objection: let f ∈ F ′ be such that µ′(f) 6= Ch(µ′(f), P (f)). Let W ′′ = ∅, F ′′ =
{
f
}
, and
let µ′′ be defined by µ′′(f) = µ′(f) for all f 6= f , and µ′′(f) = Ch(µ′(f), P (f)). The def-
inition of µ′′(w), for all w ∈ W , is implicit. Then, µ′(f) 6= Ch(µ′(f), P (f)) implies that
µ′′(f)P (f)µ′(f), and 〈W ′′, F ′′, µ′′〉 is a counterobjection to 〈W ′, F ′, µ′〉. So µ ∈ B(P ).
Second, let µ′(s) = Ch(µ′(s), P (s)) for all s ∈ F ′∪W ′. We shall prove that 〈W ′, F ′, µ′〉
is not an objection in the first place. Suppose, by the way of contradiction, that
〈W ′, F ′, µ′〉 is an objection to µ, so we can suppose—without loss of generality—that
there is f ∈ F ′ such that µ′(f)P (f)µ(f). The matching µ is individually rational, so
µ′(f)P (f)µ(f) implies that
µ(f) * Ch(µ(f) ∪ µ′(f), P (f))
Let w ∈ Ch(µ(f) ∪ µ′(f), P (f)) be such that w ∈ µ′(f)\µ(f). Now, substitutability of
P (f) implies that
w ∈ Ch(µ(f) ∪ w,P (f)).
Thus, f ∈ V (w, µ).
On the other hand, w ∈ µ′(f)\µ(f) implies that w ∈ W ′. So µ′(w)P (w)µ(w), as
〈W ′, F ′, µ′〉 is an objection. Then
f ∈ µ′(w) = Ch(µ′(w), P (w)) = Ch(µ′(w) ∪ f, P (w))
and strong substitutability of P (w) gives f ∈ Ch(µ(w) ∪ f, P (w)). But we proved that
f ∈ V (w, µ). So
µ(w) 6= Ch(µ(w) ∪ f, P (w)) ⊆ V (w, µ).
A contradiction since µ ∈ E implies that µ(w) = Ch(V (w, µ), P (w)). Thus 〈W ′, F ′, µ′〉
is not an objection, and µ ∈ B(P ).
Lemma 47. If P (F ) is substitutable, and P (W ) is strongly substitutable, then E ⊆
IRC(P ).
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Proof. Let µ ∈ E . By Lemma 38, µ is an individually rational matching. Suppose, by
way of contradiction, that 〈W ′, F ′, µ′〉 is an individually rational block of µ.
Without loss of generality, let µ′(f)P (f)µ(f), for some f ∈ F ′. Since µ is individually
rational,
Ch(µ(f) ∪ µ′(f), P (f)) * µ(f).
Let w ∈ µ′(f)\µ(f) be such that
w ∈ Ch(µ(f) ∪ µ′(f), P (f)) = Ch(µ(f) ∪ µ′(f) ∪ w,P (f)).
By substitutability of P (f), w ∈ Ch(µ(f) ∪ w,P (f)). Thus
f ∈ V (w, µ). (32)
Now. f ∈ µ′(w)\µ(w) implies
µ′(w)P (w)µ(w), (33)
as w ∈ W ′, and µ′(w) 6= µ(w). But µ′ is individually rational, so
f ∈ Ch(µ′(w), P (w)) = Ch(µ′(w) ∪ f, P (w)).
Then statement 33, and strong substitutability of P (w), implies that f ∈ Ch(µ(w) ∪
f, P (w)). So
Ch(µ(f) ∪ f, P (w))P (w)µ(w) (34)
But µ ∈ E implies that µ(w) = Ch(V (w, µ), P (f)). By Statement 32, µ(w) ∪ f ⊆
V (w, µ), which contradicts statement 34. Hence there are no individually rational blocks
of µ, and µ ∈ IRC(P ).
12 Proof of Theorems 23 and 26
12.1 Proof of Theorems 23
The proof of Theorem 23 follows from Lemmas 48, 49.
Lemma 48. Let P (W ) be substitutable. If µ ∈ M is the outcome of a SPNE, then
µ ∈ E.
Proof. Let (η∗, ξ∗) be a SPNE, and µ ∈M be the outcome of (η∗, ξ∗). For all w ∈ W ,
ξ∗w(η) ∩
{
f : w ∈ ηf
}
= Ch
({
f : w ∈ ηf
}
, P (w)
)
.
For all f ∈ F , for all η−f , let
Y (η−f ) =
{
w : f ∈ Ch
({
f˜ : w ∈ ηf˜
}
∪ f, P (w)
)}
.
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So, by definition of SPNE, η∗f ∩ Y (η
∗
−f ) = Ch(Y (η
∗
−f ), P (f)).
Let (η, ξ) be the pair of strategies obtained from (η∗, ξ∗) by having each w not propose
to firms that did not propose to w, and having each f not propose to workers that will
reject f . Thus, ξw(η) = ξ
∗
w(η) ∩
{
f : w ∈ ηf
}
and by ηf ∩ Y (η
∗
−f ) = η
∗
f ∩ Y (η
∗
−f ).
We shall show that (η, ξ) is a SPNE as well, and that its outcome is also µ. First,
it is immediate that its outcome is µ: ηf = µ(f), for all f , and for all w ∈ µ(f),
f ∈ ξw(η) Second, given a strategy profile η for firms, each w is indifferent between
proposing ξ∗w(η) and ξw(η), as they will both result in the same set of partners. For
a firm f , Y (η∗−f ) = Y (η−f ), which implies that ηf = Ch
(
Y (η−f ), P (f)
)
, and thus
(η, ξ) is a SPNE. To see that Y (η∗−f ) = Y (η−f ), note that w ∈ Y (η
∗
−f ) if and only if
f ∈ Ch
({
f˜ : w ∈ η∗
f˜
}
∪ f, P (w)
)
. But
Ch
({
f˜ : w ∈ η∗
f˜
}
∪ f, P (w)
)
= Ch
(
Ch
({
f˜ : w ∈ η∗
f˜
}
, P (w)
)
∪ f, P (w)
)
= Ch (µ(w) ∪ f, P (w))
= Ch
({
f˜ : w ∈ ηf˜
}
∪ f, P (w)
)
,
where the first equality is a consequence of substitutability of P (W ) (Blair, 1988, Propo-
sition 2.3). Hence w ∈ Y (η∗−f ) if and only if
f ∈ Ch
({
f˜ : w ∈ ηf˜
}
∪ f, P (w)
)
,
so Y (η∗−f ) = Y (η−f ).
Now we shall prove that µ ∈ E . Let f ∈ F . Note that Y (η−f ) = {w : f ∈ Ch (µ(w) ∪ f, P (w))} ,
so Y (η−f ) = U(f, µ). Now, by the definition of ηf , µ(f) = ηf = Ch(U(f, µ), P (w)).
Let w ∈W . We shall first prove that
µ(w) ⊆ V (w, µ). (35)
Let f ∈ µ(w), so w ∈ µ(f) = ηf . But ηf = Ch(Y (η−f ), P (f)), so ηf = Ch(ηf , P (f)).
Then w ∈ Ch(µ(f)∪w,P (f)) = Ch(ηf , P (f)), so f ∈ V (w, µ); this proves Statement 35.
Second, we prove that Ch(V (w, µ), P (w)) ⊆ µ(w), which together with Statement 35
implies that µ(w) = Ch(V (w, µ), P (w)). Let f ∈ Ch(V (w, µ), P (w)). By Statement 35,
µ(w) ∪ f ⊆ V (w, µ). Substitutability of P (w) implies that
f ∈ Ch(µ(w) ∪ f, P (w)). (36)
So w ∈ U(f, µ). Suppose, by way of contradiction, that f /∈ µ(w). Now, f /∈ µ(w)
implies w /∈ µ(f), so Statement 36 implies µ(f) ∪ fP (w)µ(f). But w ∈ U(f, µ), so
µ(f)∪fP (w)µ(f) contradicts µ(f) = ηf = Ch(U(f, µ), P (w)). The assumption f /∈ µ(w)
is then absurd. This finishes the proof that µ(w) = Ch(V (w, µ), P (w)). We also proved
µ(f) = Ch(U(f, µ), P (w)), so µ ∈ E .
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Lemma 49. If µ ∈ E, then µ is the outcome of some SPNE.
Proof. Define (η, ξ) by ηf = µ(f) and ξw(η) = Ch(
{
f : w ∈ ηf
}
, P (w)). Let (µ) ∈ M
be the outcome of (η, ξ). We show that (η, ξ) is a SPNE, and that (µ) = µ.
Note that, for any f and w,
{
f˜ : w ∈ ηf˜
}
∪ f = µ(w) ∪ f . Then,
{
w : f ∈ Ch
({
f˜ : w ∈ ηf˜
}
∪ f, P (w)
)}
= {w : f ∈ Ch(µ(w) ∪ f, P (w))}
= U(f, µ)
.
But µ ∈ E , so ηf = µ(f) = Ch(U(f, µ), P (f)). Hence ηf is optimal given η−f . By
definition of ξw, ξw(η) is optimal for w given any profile η. Hence (η, ξ) is a SPNE.
Now, f ∈ µ(w) if and only if w ∈ µ(f) = ηf . So,
{
f : w ∈ ηf
}
= µ(w). Then
ξw(η) = Ch(µ(w), P (w)) = µ(w), as µ(w) ∈ E implies that µ is individually rational
(Lemma 38).
Hence w ∈ µ(f) if and only if w ∈ ηf = µ(f), and f ∈ µ(w) if and only if f ∈ ξw(η) =
µ(w). So µ = µ.
12.2 Proof of Theorem 26
Let 〈W ′, F ′, µ′〉 be a block of µ. Let w ∈ W ′ be such that µ′(w)P (w)µ(w). We shall
prove that there are f, f ′ ∈ F ′, and w′ ∈W ′ such that:
• w 6= w′, f 6= f ′,
• f ∈ µ′(w)\µ(w) w′ ∈ µ′(f)\µ(f), and f ′ ∈ µ′(w′)\µ(w′)
• f wants to add w′ and w′ wants to add f ′, but w′ does not want to add f , and f ′
does not want to add w′.
Now, µ′(w)P (w)µ(w) implies that
Ch(µ(w) ∪ µ′(w), P (w))R(w)µ′(w)P (w)µ(w).
But µ ∈ E implies that µ is individually rational (Lemma 38); so µ(w)R(w)A, for all
A ⊆ µ(w). Hence
Ch(µ(w) ∪ µ′(w), P (w))\µ(w) 6= ∅.
Let f ∈ Ch(µ(w) ∪ µ′(w), P (w))\µ(w). By substitutability of P (w), f ∈ Ch(µ(w) ∪
f, P (w)); hence w wants to add f .
On the other hand, f ∈ Ch(µ(w) ∪ f, P (w)) implies that w ∈ U(f, µ). But f ∈
µ′(w)\µ(w) means that w ∈ µ′(f)\µ(f). In particular, w /∈ µ(f); so, by Lemmas 39
35
and 37, w /∈ Ch(µ(f)∪w,P (f)) = µ(f), as µ ∈ E implies µ(f) = Ch(U(f, µ), P (f)) and
µ(f) ∪ w ⊆ U(f, µ). Hence f does not want to add w.
But µ′(f) 6= µ(f), and f ∈ F ′, implies µ′(f)P (f)µ(f). By an argument that is
symmetric to the one above, there is w′ ∈ µ′(f)\µ(f), and f ′ ∈ µ′(w)\µ(w) such that f
wants to add w′ and w′ wants to add f ′, but w′ does not want to add f , and f ′ does not
want to add w′.
Recursively, given wk ∈ W
′ with µ′(wk)P (wk)µ(wk) let fk+1, wk+1, fk+1 be f , w
′ and f ′
obtained as above. Consider the sequence of alternating workers and firms constructed:
W ′ is a finite set, so there must exist k and l such that wk = wl. Say l < k; set
wˆ0 = wl, and (wˆk′ , fˆk′) = (wk′+l, fk′+l) for k
′ = 0, 1, . . . k − l. The resulting sequence is
an acceptance-rejection cycle for µ.
13 Proof of Theorems 31, 32, and 35
13.1 Proof of Theorem 31
We first establish some lemmas:
Lemma 50. Let P be substitutable. Let µ and µ′ be pre-matchings. If µ ≤B µ′ then, for
all w ∈ W and f ∈ F , U(f, µ) ⊆ U(f, µ′), and V (w, µ) ⊇ V (w, µ′).
Proof. We shall prove that V (w, µ) ⊇ V (w, µ′). The proof that U(f, µ) ⊆ U(f, µ′) is
analogous.
First, if V (w, µ′) = {∅}, then there is nothing to prove, as {∅} = V (w, µ′) ⊆ V (w, µ).
Suppose that V (w, µ′) 6= {∅} , and let f ∈ V (w, µ′). Then, w ∈ Ch(µ′(f) ∪ w,P (f)).
But µ ≤B µ′, so the definition of ≤B implies that, for all f ∈ F , either µ′(f) = µ(f)
so w ∈ Ch(µ(f)∪w,P (f)), or µ′(f) = Ch (µ′ (f) ∪ µ (f) , P (f)) . Then w ∈ Ch(µ′(f)∪
w,P (f)) implies that
w ∈ Ch (µ′(f) ∪ w,P (f))
= Ch (Ch (µ′ (f) ∪ µ (f) , P (f)) ∪ w,P (f))
(1)
=
Ch (µ′(f) ∪ µ(f) ∪ {w}, P (f)) .
Equality (1) is from Proposition 2.3 in Blair (1988) (Blair proves that, if P is substi-
tutable, then Ch (A ∪B,P (f)) = Ch (Ch (A,P (f)) ∪B,P (f)) for all A and B). Sub-
stitutability of P implies that w ∈ Ch (µ(f) ∪ w,P (f)) . Then f ∈ V (w, µ) , and thus
V (w, µ) ⊇ V (w, µ′).
Lemma 51. Let P be strongly substitutable. Let µ and µ′ be pre–matchings. If µ ≤ µ′
then, for all w ∈ W and f ∈ F , U(f, µ) ⊆ U(f, µ′), and V (w, µ) ⊇ V (w, µ′).
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Proof. We shall prove that V (w, µ) ⊇ V (w, µ′). The proof that U(f, µ) ⊆ U(f, µ′) is
analogous.
First, if V (w, µ′) = {∅}, then there is nothing to prove. Suppose that V (w, µ′) 6= {∅} ,
and let f ∈ V (w, µ′). Then, w ∈ Ch(µ′(f) ∪ w,P (f)). Strong substitutability implies
then w ∈ Ch(µ(f) ∪ w,P (f)), as µ′(f)R(f)µ(f) because µ ≤ µ′.
Let V ′ = {ν ∈ V : ν(s)R(s)∅, for all s ∈ F ∪W}. We need to work on the set V ′
instead of V because ν0 and ν1 are the smallest and largest, respectively, elements of V
′.
Note that T (V) ⊆ V ′, so there is no loss in working with V ′.
Lemma 52. T |V ′ is monotone increasing, when V
′ is endowed with orders ≤B or ≤.
Proof. We show that T |V ′ is monotone increasing when V
′ is endowed with order ≤B.
That is, whenever µ ≤B µ′ we have (Tµ) ≤B (Tµ′). The proof for ≤ follows along the
same lines, using Lemma 51 instead of 50.
Let µ ≤B µ′ , and fix f ∈ F and w ∈ W . Lemma 50 says that U(f, µ) ⊆ U(f, µ′).
We first show that
Ch (U (f, µ′) , P (f)) = Ch ([Ch (U (f, µ′) , P (f)) ∪ Ch (U (f, µ) , P (f))] , P (f)) . (37)
To see this, let S ⊆ Ch (U (f, µ′) , P (f)) ∪ Ch (U (f, µ) , P (f)). Then S ⊆ U(f, µ) ∪
U(f, µ′) = U(f, µ′), so Ch (U (f, µ′) , P (f))R(f)S. But, Ch (U (f, µ′) , P (f)) ⊆ Ch (U (f, µ′) , P (f))∪
Ch (U (f, µ) , P (f)), so we have established statement 37.
Now, (Tµ′)(f) = Ch (U (f, µ′) , P (f)) and (Tµ)(f) = Ch (U (f, µ) , P (f)), so state-
ment 37 implies that
(Tµ′)(f) = Ch([(Tµ′)(f) ∪ (Tµ)(f)] , P (f))). (38)
The proof for (Tµ′)(w) is analogous.
Now T |V ′ : V
′ → V ′ is monotone increasing, and V ′ is a lattice (Remark 1). T (V) ⊆ V ′
so E ⊆ V ′, and E equals the set of fixed points of T |V ′ . So Tarski’s fixed point theorem
implies that 〈E ,≤B〉 and 〈E ,≤〉 are non-empty lattices. Item (2) in Theorem 31 follows
from standard results (Topkis, 1998, Chapter 4).
This finishes the proof of Theorem 31.
13.2 Proof of Theorem 32
We first prove item 1.
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Let ν, ν ′ ∈ E be such that ν ′(w)R(w)ν(w) for all w ∈ W . Suppose, by way of
contradiction, that there is some f ∈ F such that ν ′(f)P (f)ν(f). Let C = Ch(ν(f) ∪
ν ′(f), P (f)), so CR(f)ν ′(f)P (f)ν(f). But ν ∈ E implies that ν(f) = Ch(ν(f), P (f))
(Lemma 38), so C * ν(f). Hence there is w ∈ C\ν(f); note that w ∈ ν ′(f). Now
w ∈ C = Ch
(
ν(f) ∪ ν ′(f) ∪ w,P (f)
)
and substitutability of P (f) implies that w ∈ Ch(ν(f) ∪ w,P (f)). So f ∈ V (w, ν).
Now, w ∈ ν ′(f)\ν(f) implies f ∈ ν ′(w)\ν(w). Then ν ′(w)R(w)ν(w) implies ν ′(w)P (w)ν(w),
as P (w) is strict. But ν ′(w) = Ch(ν ′(w), P (w)) = Ch(ν ′(w)∪f, P (w)) by Lemma 38. So
strong substitutability implies that f ∈ Ch(ν(w) ∪ f, P (w)). Since f /∈ ν(w), we obtain
ν(w)∪ fP (w)ν(w). A contradiction with ν ∈ E , since we showed f ∈ V (w, ν) and ν ∈ E
implies ν(w) = Ch(V (w, ν), P (w)).
To prove item 2 in the theorem, note that when P (F ) is strongly substitutable the
model is symmetric, and the argument above holds with firms in place of workers, and
workers in place of firms.
13.3 Proof of Theorem 35
We first prove that 〈E ,≤〉 is a sublattice of 〈V ,≤〉. That 〈E ,≤〉 is distributive follows
then immediately. We need to verify that the lattice operations ∨ and ∧ in V are the
lattice operations in 〈E ,≤〉.
Let ν1, ν2 ∈ E . Let ν = ν1 ∨ ν2 in V . We shall prove that ν is the join of ν1, ν2 in
〈E ,≤〉. The proof for ν1 ∧ ν2 is analogous.
By hypothesis ν is a matching; so
w ∈ ν (f) ⇔ f ∈ ν (w) .
We prove that ν ∈ E . Suppose, by way of contradiction, that there is f such that
(Tν)(f) 6= ν(f). Without loss of generality, say that ν(f) = ν1(f)R(f)ν2(f). Since
ν1 ∈ E , ν1 is individually rational (Lemma 38), so f ∈ Ch(ν1(w), P (w)) = Ch(ν1(w) ∪
f, P (w)), for all w ∈ ν1(f). For all w, on the other hand, ν1(w)R(w)ν(w). So strong
substitutability gives f ∈ Ch(ν(w) ∪ f, P (w)) for all w ∈ ν1(f). Thus ν1(f) ⊆ U(f, ν).
Since, (Tν)(f) = Ch(U(f, ν), P (f)), and ν1 is individually rational, (Tν)(f)\ν(f) 6= ∅.
Let w ∈ (Tν)(f)\ν(f). By substitutability, w ∈ Ch(ν1(f) ∪ w,P (f)). Strong substi-
tutability and ν1(f)R(f)ν2(f) imply then w ∈ Ch(ν2(f) ∪ w,P (f)). So
f ∈ V (w, νi), (39)
i = 1, 2.
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On the other hand w ∈ (Tν)(f) implies w ∈ U(f, ν) so
f ∈ Ch(ν(w) ∪ f, P (w)). (40)
Let i be such that ν(w) = νi(w). Then Statement (39), and ν i ∈ E , implies νi(w) ∪ f ∈
V (w, νi).
But we assumed w /∈ ν(f), so f /∈ ν i(w), as ν is a matching. Then ν i(w)∪ f 6= νi(w):
a contradiction with νi ∈ E , given Statement (40) and that ν(w) ∪ f ∈ V (w, ν i).
For the rest of the theorem, we need a lemma.
Lemma 53. Let P be strongly substitutable. For all f and w, for any ν and ν ′ in
V: U(f, ν ∨ ν ′) = U(f, ν) ∪ U(f, ν ′), U(f, ν ∧ ν ′) = U(f, ν) ∩ U(f, ν ′), V (w, ν ∨ ν ′) =
V (w, ν) ∩ V (w, ν ′), and V (w, ν ∧ ν ′) = V (w, ν) ∪ V (w, ν ′).
Proof. We shall only prove that U(f, ν ∨ν ′) = U(f, ν)∪U(f, ν ′), and that V (w, ν ∨ν ′) =
V (w, ν) ∩ V (w, ν ′). The proof of the other statements is symmetric.
We shall first prove that U(f, ν ∨ ν ′) ⊆ U(f, ν) ∪ U(f, ν ′). Let w ∈ U(f, ν ∨ ν ′),
so f ∈ Ch ((ν ∨ ν ′)(w) ∪ f, P (w)). Now, (ν ∨ ν ′)(f) equals either ν(f) or ν ′(f). If
(ν ∨ ν ′)(w) = ν(w), then f ∈ Ch (ν(w) ∪ f, P (w)); so w ∈ U(f, ν). Similarly, if (ν ∨
ν ′)(w) = ν ′(w), then w ∈ U(f, ν ′). This proves that U(f, ν ∨ ν ′) ⊆ U(f, ν) ∪ U(f, ν ′).
Second, we prove that U(f, ν) ∪ U(f, ν ′) ⊆ U(f, ν ∨ ν ′). Let w ∈ U(f, ν), so f ∈
Ch (ν(w) ∪ f, P (w)). Now ν(w)R(w)(ν ∨ ν ′)(w), so strong substitutability implies f ∈
Ch ((ν ∨ ν ′)(w) ∪ f, P (w)). Hence w ∈ U(f, ν∨ν ′). This proves that U(f, ν)∪U(f, ν ′) ⊆
U(f, ν ∨ ν ′). So, U(f, ν ∨ ν ′) = U(f, ν) ∪ U(f, ν ′).
We shall now prove that V (w, ν ∨ ν ′) = V (w, ν) ∩ V (w, ν ′). First we prove V (w, ν ∨
ν ′) ⊆ V (w, ν) ∩ V (w, ν ′). Let f ∈ V (w, ν ∨ ν ′), so
w ∈ Ch ((ν ∨ ν ′)(f) ∪ w,P (f)) . (41)
Without loss of generality, say (ν ∨ ν ′)(f) = ν(f)R(f)ν ′(f). Then (ν ∨ ν ′)(f) =
ν(f) implies that f ∈ V (w, ν). Statement 41, and strong substitutability imply w ∈
Ch (ν ′(f) ∪ w,P (f)) , as (ν∨ν ′)(f)R(f)ν ′(f). Thus f ∈ V (w, ν), and we obtain V (w, ν∨
ν ′) ⊆ V (w, ν) ∩ V (w, ν ′).
Finally, we prove that V (w, ν) ∩ V (w, ν ′) ⊆ V (w, ν ∨ ν ′). Let Let f ∈ V (w, ν) ∩
V (w, ν ′), so w ∈ Ch (ν(f) ∪ w,P (f)) and w ∈ Ch (ν ′(f) ∪ w,P (f)). Now, (ν ∨ ν ′)(w)
equals either ν(w) or ν ′(w), so either way w ∈ Ch ((ν ∨ ν ′)(f) ∪ w,P (f)). Hence f ∈
V (w, ν ∨ ν ′).
Lemma 53 implies immediately that ψ is a lattice homomorphism: Let ν ′, ν ∈ V . For
any f and w,
(ψ(ν ∨ ν ′))(f) = U(f, ν ∨ ν ′) = U(f, ν) ∪ U(f, ν ′) = (ψν)(f) ∪ (ψν ′)(f)
(ψ(ν ∨ ν ′))(w) = V (w, ν ∨ ν ′) = V (w, ν) ∩ V (w, ν ′) = (ψν)(f) ∩ (ψν ′)(f).
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So ψ(ν ∨ ν ′) = ψν t ψν ′. That ψ(ν ∧ ν ′) = ψν u ψν ′ is also trivial from Lemma 53.
We now show that ψ|E is an isomorphism onto its range. Let ν, ν
′ ∈ E . Let ψν = ψν ′.
Then, for all f , U(f, ν) = U(f, ν ′) so (Tν)(f) = (Tν ′)(f). Similarly (Tν)(w) = (Tν ′)(w)
for all w. So Tν = Tν ′ Then ν, ν ′ ∈ E imply ν = ν ′, as v = Tν and v′ = Tν ′. Hence ψ is
one-to-one, as ψν = ψν ′ implies ν = ν ′.
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